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EDITORIAL NOTES
SPECIAL INTERROGAToRiE.-Our Statute provides that upon the
trial of any issue by a jury the trial court may, on motion of any
party, direct the jury to render separate special verdicts and make
separate findings of fact, in addition to the general verdict.' This
action of the trial court is reviewable.2 When any special finding
or findings shall be inconsistent with the general verdict, the
special findings shall prevail and the court shall enter judgment
thereon.3
This provision of our statute has been the subject of judicial
construction through a rather long line of decisions by our Supreme
Court of Appeals. The first case in which our court was called
upon to construe this section, held that the lower court was justi-
fied in its refusal to submit to the jury certain special interroga-
tories because they, if submitted, would be inconclusive of the is-
sue; that the submission of special interrogatories was within the
sound discretion of the court, which discretion was reviewable,
and that the questions submitted must be such that if their an-
swers are contrary to the general verdict, they would control it.
The next case' held that the refusal of the trial court to submit
certain special questions was proper, because they were irrelevant
and immaterial, and, if answered contrary to the general verdict,
would not control it. This doctrine has been reaffirmed time and
again in language varying little, if any, from that originally used.'
Special interrogatories too general in their terms are rightly re-
fused.7
Since our statute provides that a general verdict will be over-
thrown by inconsistent answers to special interrogatories, it is
important that an attempt be made to discover when such incon-
sistency exists. Our court has given no categorical answer to this
question. It is, no doubt, well that the court has not attempted
to lay down a matheriatical formula whereby all problems of in-
consistency or alleged inconsistency might be solved. Certain
1 Ch. 131, §5, BAnx~s W. VA. CODE, 1923.
2 Idem.
8 Idem.
4 Kerr v. Lunsford, 31 W. Va. 659, 8 S. E. 493 (1888).
5 Wheeling Bridge Co. v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 34 W. Va. 155,
11 S. E. 1009 (1890).
a Andrews v. Mundy, 36 W. Va. 22, 14 S. E. 414 (1892); Richards V.
Iron Works, 56 W. Va. 510, 49 S. E. 437 (1904); Millan v. Bartlett, 78
W. Va. 367, 89 S. E. 711 (1916); Glinco v. Wimer, 88 W. Va. 508, 107 S.
E. 198 (1921) ; Brogan v. Traction Co., 76 W. Va. 698, 86 S. E. 753 (1915) ;
Ward v. Salt & Coal Co., 79 W. Va. 371, 92 S. E. 92 (1917); Bentley -v.
Insurance Co., 40 W. Va. 729, 23 S. E. 584 (1895); Charlton v. Pancake,
96 W. Va. 363, 127 S. E. 70 (1925); Mingo County Court v. Coal Com-
pany, 142 S. E. 430 (W. Va. 1928).
7 Bice v. Electrical Co., 62 W. Va. 685, 59 S. E. 626 (1907).
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rules, principles and standards have been declared, however, that
-will prove useful in determining whether the special findings and
the general verdict are consistent in each individual case as it
arises.
When our court began to construe that phase of Section 5
dealing with the consistency of the general and special findings
of the jury it laid down the broad general doctrine that when-
ever the answer to a special finding was inconsistent with
the general verdict, the answer to the special finding pre-
vailed and judgment should be entered accordingly.8  The
court has since materially modified and qualified its language.
It no longer adheres to the broad general doctrine laid down
in the Bess Case, but in order for special findings to prevail
over the general verdict certain stricter requirements must
be measured up to. For example the special findings must be ir-
reconcilably inconsistent with the general verdict." The special
findings must exclude every reasonable conclusion that will au-
thorize the verdict,10 when the special findings and general ver-
dict cannot be reconciled under any supposable facts provable un-
der the issue,'- when the special findings are invincibly opposed
to the general verdict,'2 when the special findings wholly destroy
the general verdict,13 when the special findings taken as a whole
are clearly inconsistent with the general verdict, provided the
special findings are consistent with each other,14 when a special
finding negatives an indispensable element making up the grounds
of recovery there is such irreconcilable inconsistency as to war-
rant a new trial. When the answer to a special finding negatives
an essential element for recovery and the court cannot find in the
evidence any reasonably accurate or substantial basis for the
ascertainment of the loss sustained, there is such irreconcilability
between the special findings and general verdict as to warrant a
new trial'" In these last two cases the special findings absolute-
ly negatived grounds for recovery while the general verdicts were
for the plaintiff. Yet, in these cases of unquestioned incon-
3 Bess v. 0. & 0. Ry. Co., 35 W. Va. 492, 14 S. B. 234 (1891).
9 Trobie v. Ritter-Conley Co., 89 W. Va. 123, 108 S. E. 590 (1921);
Prager v. Wheeling, 91 W. Va. 597, 114 S. E. 155 (1922).
lo Box Company v. The Hub, 89 W. Va. 101, 108 S. E. 601 (1921);
Anania v. N. & W. Ry. Co., 77 W. Va. 105, 87 S. E. 167 (1915).
11 Idem.
12 Idem.
23 Duckworth v. Stalnaker, 74 W. Va. 247, 81 S. E. 989 (1914).
14 Peninsular Company v. Insurance Co., 31 W Va. 660, 14 S. E. 237
(1891).
1r5 supra, n. 8.
16 Grass v. Development Co., 75 W. Va. 719, 84 S. E. 750 (1915).
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sistency the court showed its reluctance to enter judgment on the
special findings, and ordered a new trial.
A rather careful investigation has failed to disclose a single
case where the court has sustained a judgment entered on the
special findings or ordered one to be so entered. The Duckworth
Case' 7 on first impression would seem to be such a case. But a
closer reading of that case discloses the fact the jury returned a
general verdict of $1,500 for the plaintiff and a number of special
findings aggregating $1,400. The trial court was of the opinion
that one special finding of $200 was not supported by the
evidence and entered judgment for $1,200 on the general verdict,
corrected as to amount by the special findings. Wile the opinion
in this case is somewhat confusing and contradictory, it makes it
clear that the action of the lower court in overruling defendant's
motion to set aside the general verdict is sustained; that the
judgment entered on the general verdict is affirmed and no diffi-
culty met with in harmonizing the special findings with the gen-
eral verdict.
The reluctance of the court to allow special findings to over-
throw the general verdict is further shown by the fact that the
court will indulge no presumption in favor of the special findings
while every presumption will be indulged in favor of the general
verdict."' Nor will the court strain the language of the special
findings to override the general verdict.'9 And further, it is the
duty of the court, if possible, to harmonize the special findings
with each other and with the general verdict.20 The court may
refer to the evidence to determine whether the special findings
and the general verdict are consistent or not.2' In an early case 22
Judge Holt by way of dictum had said that only the pleadings,
general and special findings could be considered. This dictum
has been dealt with by name in a later case 23 and expressly dis-
avowed. In one case,24 at least, in which the trial court had set
aside the general verdict and entered judgment for defendant,
notwithstanding verdict as a result of special findings, the upper
court reinstated the general verdict and entered judgment thereon.
A special finding sustained by the evidence, sufficient to support
the general verdict, is not inconsistent therewith.26
17 Supra, n. 13.
18 Runyan v. Light Co., 68 W. Va. 609, 71 S. E. 259 (1911).
21 Idem.
20 Supra, n. 13.
21 Supra, n. 10.
22 Supra, n. 14.
23 Supra, n. 10.
24 State v. Surety Co., 99 W. Va. 123, 127 S. E. 919 (1925).
2 G Moorefield -v. Lewis, 96 W. Va. 112, 123 S. E. 564 (1924).
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It is not error to refuse to submit to the jury special questions
when the general verdict will furnish a complete answer to
them.26 Nor is it error to refuse them when the issues are few
and uncomplicated, and no aid will be given the jury in reaching
a correct conclusion.2 7  It is submitted that the language of the
court is not strong enough in this regard and that it should be
positive error to submit special questions, when the circumstances
are such as those just enumerated. In an early case28 dealing
with the subject of special interrogatories our court warned
against the giving of large numbers of them to the jury and
called attention to a tendency even that early to restrain rather
than expand the practice of their submission. In this connection
the court said:
"It is an abuse fraught with evil, for it tends to bewilder
the jury rather than to aid them."
It is not error to refuse to submit one of two special questions
when the answer to the one negatives the answer to the other.23
Two special questions covering the same matter should not be
given, but if one of the questions is so drawn as to more definite-
ly or pointedly inquire into the matter, it should be given. 0
Special questions should not be submitted for purposes of itemiz-
ing damages assessed.31 The statute does not apply to criminal
cases.
3 2
In connection with the problem as to when special questions
should and should not be submitted to the jury, it is well to con-
sider the purpose of the statute providing for their submission, as
construed by our court.
"The purpose of the statute is to ascertain and separate
one or more controlling facts, to the end that the existence or
non-existence of some facts upon which the issue turns may
be de iberately examined, patiently considered and expresslyfound, so that a proper judgment may be rendered according
to the truth and the very right of the- case."Is
The object of the statute is that a proper judgment may be ren-
dered according to the very right of the case ;34 to prevent poorly
26 Moran v. Moran, 93 W. Va. 344, 116 S. E. 709 (1923).
27 Lovett v. Lisagor, 100 W. Va. 154, 130 S. E. 125 (1925).
28 Supra, n. 14.
29 Harman v. Power Co., 77 W. Va. 48, 86 S. E. 917 (1915).
so Veith v. Coal Co., 51 W. Va. 96, 41 S. E. 187 (1902).
31 Lyons v. Real Estate Co., 71 W. Va. 754, 77 S. E. 525 (1913).
32 State v. Boggs, 87 W. Va. 738, 106 S. E. 47 (1921).
33 Griffith v. Coal Co., 78 W. Va. 34, 88 S. E. 595 (1916).
34 Supra, n. 14.
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considered and ill advised general verdicts;B5 to find controlling
facts, so that the very right of the ease can be reached. 0
At first the court laid down the broad general rule that special
questions should be submitted at a time so as not to work sur-
prise or be manifestly unfair, but the matter was largely in the
discretion of the trial court." In a case handed down a few days
later Judge Brannon urged the submission of special interroga-
tories before argument of counsel and said that a rule requiring
it would be advisable." In a much later case30 our Court has
said that the statute contemplates the submission of instructions
prior to the argument of counsel and adds that proper practice
dictates a like rule respecting special interrogatories.
When special questions have been submitted and the jury is
discharged after bringing in a general verdict only without the
party submitting the questions asking the court to have them an-
swered, he is presumed to have waived such answers.4" It has
been held, however, that even though the special questions have
been submitted after the argument of counsel and the giving of in-
structions, the withdrawal of the questions after the jury had de-
liberated two hours over the protest of the party offering them, is
error.
41
Answers to special interrogatories should be direct, definite and
complete.4 2  Answers expressing opinions without the facts on
which such opinions are based will not overthrow the general
verdict.43 Questions requiring mere speculation on the part of
the jury should not be submitted ;44 nor should those assuming
controverted facts.4 5  It is error, however, to refuse to ask the
jury how much they had included in their verdict for actual
damages, or in the alternative, how much for exemplary dam-
ages.40  -ARLoS JAcKsoN HARBERT.Y
or Supra, n. 27.
so Wills v. Coal Co., 104 W. Va. 12, 20, 138 S. E. 749 (1921).
37 S 'pra, n. 14.
so McKelvey v. C. & 0. Ry. Co., 35 W. Va. 500, 14 S. E. 261 (1891).
so Proudfoot v. Transp. Co., 100 W. Va. 733, 132 S. E. 746 (1926).
40 Carrico v. Ry. Co., 39 W. Va. 86, 19 S. E. 571 (1894); Griffith v.
Coal Co., 78 W. Va. 34, 88 S. E. 595 (1916).
41 Supra, n. 38.
42 Supra, n. 18.
43 Supra, n. 18.
44 Supra, n. 18.
' Supra, n. 18.
40 Pennington v. Gillespie, 66 W. Va. 643, 66 S. E. 1009 (1910).
• Member of the Clarksburg, W. Va., Bar.
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